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Abstract
Many countries compete against one another in  on a firm-level panel  data set from Lithuania, the
attracting  foreign investors by offering  ever more  estimation results are consistent with the existence  of
generous  incentive packages and justifying their actions  productivity spillovers.  They suggest that a  10 percent
with the productivity gains that are expected  to accrue to  increase  in the foreign  presence  in downstream  sectors is
domestic  producers from knowledge  externalities  associated with 0.38 percent  rise in output of each
generated  by foreign  affiliates.  Despite  this being hugely  domestic firm  in the supplying industry. The data
important to public  policy choices,  there is little  indicate that these  spillovers are not restricted
conclusive  evidence  indicating that domestic firms  geographically,  since  local firms seem to benefit from the
benefit from foreign  presence  in their sector. It is  operation  of downstream  foreign  affiliates on their own,
possible, though, that researchers  have been looking for  as well as in other regions. The results further show that
foreign direct investment  (FDI) spillovers  in the wrong  greater  productivity benefits  are associated with
place. Multinationals have  an incentive to prevent  domestic-market,  rather than export-oriented,  foreign
information leakage  that would  enhance the performance  affiliates.  But no difference  is detected between the
of their local competitors in the same industry but at the  effects of fully-owned foreign firms and those with joint
same time may want to transfer  knowledge to their local  domestic and foreign ownership.
suppliers in other  sectors.  Spillovers  from FDI may be,  The findings of a positive correlation between
therefore,  more likely to take  place through backward  productivity  growth of domestic  firms and the increase in
linkages-that  is, contacts  between domestic suppliers of  multinational  presence in downstream sectors should
intermediate  inputs and their multinational  clients-and  not, however, be interpreted  as a call for subsidizing FDI.
thus would not have  been captured  by the earlier  These  results  are consistent with the existence  of
literature.  knowledge  spillovers from foreign affiliates to their local
This paper focuses on the understudied  issue of FDI  suppliers,  but they may also be a result of increased
spillovers through backward linkages and goes beyond  competition in upstream sectors. While the former case
existing studies  by shedding  some light on  factors driving  would call for offering FDI incentive  packages, it would
this phenomenon. It also improves over existing  not be the optimal policy in the latter.  Certainly more
literature  by addressing several econometric  problems  research is needed to disentangle  these two effects.
that may have biased the results of earlier research.  Based
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World Bank, 1818  H Street NW, Washington,  DC 20433. Please contact Paulina Flewitt, room MC3-333, telephone 202-
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Following  the  advice  of multilateral  development  agencies,  policymakers  in  many
developing  and  transition  economies  place  attracting  foreign direct  investment  (FDI)  high  on
their agenda,  expecting FDI inflows to bring new technologies,  know-how and thus contribute to
increasing  productivity and competitiveness  of domestic  industries.  Many  countries  go beyond
national  treatment  of multinationals  by offering  foreign  companies,  through  subsidies  and  tax
holidays,  more  favorable  conditions  than those  granted  to  domestic  firms.'  As the  economic
rationale  for this  special  treatment,  policy makers  cite positive  externalities  generated  by FDI
through productivity spillovers to domestic firms.
The only trouble is that there is no proof that positive productivity externalities generated
by foreign presence actually exist.  As Dani Rodrik (1999) remarked, "today's policy literature is
filled with extravagant  claims about positive  spillovers from FDI but the evidence is sobering."
And  indeed  the  difficulties  associated  with  disentangling  different  effects  at  play  and  data
limitations  have  prevented  researchers  from  providing  conclusive  evidence  of  positive
externalities  resulting  from FDI.  While  recent  firm-level  studies have  overcome  many of the
difficulties  faced by the earlier literature, the message emerging from them is not very optimistic.
The  existing  literature  on this  subject  is of three  kinds.  First,  there  are  case  studies
including descriptions pertaining to particular FDI projects or specific countries,  which however
rarely offer quantitative  information  and are not  easily generalized  (see for  instance,  Rhee  and
Belot,  1989;  Moran  2001).  Then  there  is  a plethora of industry level  studies,  most of which
show a positive correlation  between foreign presence and sectoral productivity.2  Their downside
is the difficulty  in establishing  the  direction  of the causality.  It  is possible  that this positive
association is caused by the fact that multinationals  tend to locate in high productivity industries
rather than by genuine productivity spillovers.  It may also be a result of FDI inflows forcing less
productive  domestic  firms  to  exit  and/or multinationals  increasing  their share of host country
' For instance,  in the late 1980s, the state of Kentucky offered Toyota an incentive package worth (in present value)
125-147 million dollars for a plant expected to employ 3,000 workers.  In 1991, Motorola was paid 50.75 million
pounds to locate a mobile-phone factory employing 3,000 people in Scotland (Haskel et al., 2001, p. 1).  FDI
incentives are also offered by developing and transition economies. As an illustration may serve the fact that foreign
firms in Hungary received 92.6 percent of all tax concessions provided in the country in 2000 (Csaki, 2001, p. 16).
2  See, for example, the pioneering work by Caves (1974) focusing on Australia, Blomstr6m and Persson's (1983)
and Blomstr6m and Wolff's (1994) papers on Mexico and the summary of studies on Mexican data by Blomstr6m
(1989).
1market,  both of which would raise  the  average  productivity  in the  industry.  Finally,  there  is
research based on firm-level panel  data, which examines  whether productivity of domestic firms
is correlated with the extent of foreign presence  in their sector or region.  However, most of these
studies, such as for instance, careful analyses done by Haddad and Harrison (1993)  on Morocco,
Aitken  and  Harrison  (1999)  on  Venezuela  and  Djankov  and  Hoekman  (2000)  on  the  Czech
Republic cast doubt on the existence of spillovers from FDI in developing countries.  They either
fail to find a significant effect or produce the evidence of negative  horizontal  spillovers, i.e., the
effect the presence of multinational  corporations  has on domestic  firms in the same sector.  The
picture  is more  optimistic  in  the case of industrialized  countries  as a recent paper  by Haskel,
Pereira  and Slaughter (2002) gives  convincing  evidence of positive FDI spillovers taking place
in the UK.3
It is possible, though, that researchers have been looking for FDI spillovers in the wrong
place.  Since multinationals  have an incentive to prevent information leakage that would enhance
the  performance  of  their  local  competitors,  but  at  the  same  time  might  want  to  transfer
knowledge to their local suppliers,  spillovers from FDI are more likely to be vertical rather than
horizontal  in nature.  In other words,  spillovers are most likely to take place  through backward
linkages,  that  is  contacts  between  domestic  suppliers  of  intermediate  inputs  and  their
multinational clients, and thus they would not have been captured by the earlier studies.4
As  Blomstrom  et al.  (2000)  point out, however,  there  are hardly  any empirical  studies
analyzing explicitly the relationship between linkages and spillovers.  The notable exceptions  are
two  recent  papers  by  Blalock  (2001)  and  Schoors  and  van  der  Tol  (2001),  which  provide
evidence  of positive  FDI spillovers  through  backward  linkages.5 Moreover,  despite  the  keen
interest of policy makers in the subject,  little is known about  factors driving vertical  spillovers.
This study takes the first step towards filling this gap in the literature.
The purpose  of this  study is  twofold.  First,  we  examine  whether  the productivity  of
domestic  fitms is correlated with the presence of multinationals  in downstream  sectors (i.e., their
potential customers).  Detecting such an effect would be consistent with the existence of broadly
3For a survey of the literature on horizontal spillovers from FDI see G6rg and Strobl (2001).
4For  a theoretical justification of spillovers through backward linkages see Rodriguez-Clare  (1996),  Markusen and
Venables (1999) and Saggi (2002). For case studies see Moran (2001).
5 Kugler (2000) also finds inter-sectoral  technology spillovers from FDI in Colombia.  However, he does not
distinguish between different channels through which such spillovers may be occuning (e.g., backward versus
forward linkages).
2defined spillovers through backward linkages. We improve over the existing literature by taking
into account  econometric problems that may have biased the results of earlier work.  Namely, we
employ the semiparametric  estimation method  suggested by Olley and Pakes (1996)  to account
for endogeneity of input demand.  Moreover,  we correct standard errors to take into account the
fact  that the measures of potential  spillovers  are industry specific while the observations  in the
data set are  at the firm level.  As Moulton (1990) pointed out, failing to make such a correction
will lead to  serious downward bias  in the estimated  errors  thus resulting  in spurious finding of
statistical significance for the aggregate variable of interest.
Second, we go beyond the existing literature by shedding  some light on determinants of
spillovers.  We examine whether potential benefits stemming from vertical linkages are related to
export-orientation of multinationals  in downstream sectors and the extent of foreign ownership in
affiliates.  Based on case studies and investor surveys, these factors have often been conjectured
to influence the extent and benefits of backward linkages, but to the best of our knowledge, their
impact has not been systematically examined.6
Our  analysis  is based  on the  data from  the  annual  enterprise  survey  conducted  by the
Lithuanian Statistical Office.  The survey coverage  is extensive,  as firms accounting for about  85
percent of output in each sector are included.  The data constitute  an unbalanced panel spanning
over  the period  1996-2000.  Focusing on a transition  economy,  such as  Lithuania,  seems very
suitable for this project as the endowment of skilled labor enjoyed by transition countries makes
them a particularly likely place where productivity  spillovers could manifest themselves.7
Our results can  be summarized  as follows.  We find empirical  evidence  consistent  with
the  existence  of positive  spillovers  from  FDI taking  place  through backward  linkages but no
indication of spillovers  occurring through horizontal channels.  In other words, firm productivity
is positively correlated with the extent of potential contacts  with multinational customers but not
with  the  presence  of multinationals  in  the  same  industry.  The  data  also  indicate  that  these
correlations  are  not local in nature,  that is, they are  not restricted  exclusively  to  foreign firms
operating  in  the  same  region  of the  country.  The magnitude  of the  effect  is  economically
meaningful as a ten percent increase  in the foreign presence in downstream sectors is associated
6~~~~~~~  s
6 See UNCTC (2001,  chapter 4) for a cormprehensive review of this topic.
For instance,  during  1990-2000 the number of scientists and engineers in R&D activities per million people was
equal to 2,031  in Lithuania, as cornpared to 2,139 in Korea, 711 in Argentina,  168 in Brazil and 154 in Malaysia
(Global Economic Indicators,  2002, World Bank).
3with a 0.38 percent rise in output of each firm in the supplying industry.  As for the determinants,
we  find that  the productivity  effect  is larger when the  multinationals  in the sourcing  sector are
oriented  towards  supplying  the  domestic  market  rather  than  focusing  mainly  on  exporting.
Finally, there is no statistically significant difference  between the productivity effects associated
with partially- and fully-owned foreign projects.
In summary,  this paper adds to  the understanding of externalities  generated  by FDI in a
host  country  economy,  which  is  a  hugely  important  issue  for public  policy.  Our  finding  of
positive correlation between firm productivity  and multinational  presence in downstream sectors
is,  however,  by  no  means  a  call  for  subsidizing  FDI.  These  results  are  consistent  with  the
existence  of knowledge  spillovers  from  foreign  affiliates  to  their local  suppliers  but  they may
also  be  due  to  increased  competition  in  upstream  sectors.  The  latter  may  be  the  case  if
multinationals  entering downstream sectors force  less productive domestic producers to exit thus
lowering  the  demand  for domestically  produced  intermediates,  either  because  they  are  more
efficient and need fewer inputs8 or they choose to import their inputs (due to their higher quality,
constraints imposed by the parent company,  etc.).  The welfare implications of the two scenarios
are  quite  different.  While  the  former  case would  call  for FDI  incentives,  it would  not be  the
optimal policy in the latter.  More research is certainly needed to disentangle these effects.
This  study  is  structured  as  follows.  In  the  next  section,  we  briefly  discuss  vertical
spillovers  and their determinants,  followed by a description of FDI inflows  into Lithuania.  Then
we  introduce  our  data  and  the  estimation  strategy.  In  the  following  section,  we present  the
empirical results.  We conclude in the closing section.
Vertical Spillovers and Their Determinants
Productivity spillovers  from FDI take place when the  entry or presence of multinational
corporations increases productivity of domestic firms in a host country and the multinationals  do
not  fully internalize  the  value of these  benefits.  Spillovers  may take  place  when  local  firms
improve  their  efficiency  by  copying  technologies  of foreign  affiliates  operating  in  the  local
See Saggi's (2002) model for such a scenario.
4market either based on observation  or by hiring workers trained by the affiliates.  Another kind
of spillovers  occurs  if multinational  entry leads  to more  severe  competition in the host country
market and forces local firms to use their existing resources more efficiently or to search for new
technologies  (Blomstrom and Kokko,  1998).  While the knowledge spillovers present a rationale
for  government  action  to  subsidize  FDI  inflows,  this  is  not  the  case  when  the  improved
productivity of local firms is due to increased  competition,  as inducing  greater competition may
be achieved by other means (import liberalization, anti-trust policies, etc.).
When local firms benefit from the presence of foreign companies in their sector, we refer
to  this phenomenon  as horizontal  spillovers.  To the  extent  that domestic  firms  compete with
multinationals,  the  latter have  an  incentive  to prevent  technology  leakage  and spillovers  from
taking place.  This can be achieved this through  formal protection of their intellectual  property,
trade secrecy, paying higher wages  or locating in countries  or industries  where domestic  firms
have limited imitative capacities to begin with.
On the other hand,  the term vertical  spillovers  (in this paper restricted  to the  backward
linkage  channel)  refers  to productivity  spillovers  taking place  due to linkages between  foreign
firms and their local suppliers. Such spillovers can operate through: (i) direct knowledge transfer
from foreign customers to local suppliers;9 (ii) higher requirements regarding product quality and
on-time delivery introduced by multinationals,  which provide incentive to domestic suppliers  to
upgrade their production management  or  technology;  (iii) indirect knowledge transfer  through
movement of labor; (iv)  increased  demand for intermediate  products  due to multinational  entry,
which  allows  local  suppliers  to  reap  the  benefits  of  scale  economies;'0 (v)  competition
effect-multinationals  acquiring domestic  firms may choose to source intermediates  abroad thus
breaking existing supplier-customer  relationships and increasing competition  in the intermediate
products market."I
9As numerous case studies indicate (see Moran 2001), multinationals often provide technical assistance to their
suppliers in order to raise the quality of their products  or facilitate innovation.  They help suppliers with
management training and organization of  the production process, purchasing raw materials and even finding
additional customers.  Note that the existence of linkages does not necessarily guarantee that spillovers take place
nor does the fact that multinationals may charge for services provided preclude the presence of spillovers.
Spillovers take place when foreign affiliates are unable to extract the full value of the resulting productivity increase
through direct payment or lower prices they pay for intermediates  sourced from the local firum
'° For a theoretical  model, see Rivera-Batiz  and Rivera-Batiz (1990).
' One of the largest FDI projects  in Romania, Renault's purchase of an equity stake in Dacia, the local automobile
maker, may serve as an example.  The initial transaction took place in 1999 with subsequent increases in Renault's
share in 2001and 2002.  After the acquisition,  the French company promised to continue sourcing inputs from local
5Now  let's  turn  to  factors  that  could  potentially  drive  vertical  spillovers.  First,  the
motivation  for  undertaking  FDI  is  likely  to  affect  the  extent  of local  sourcing  by  foreign
affiliates.  It has been suggested that domestic-market-oriented  foreign affiliates tend to purchase
more locally that export-oriented ones (UNCTAD 2000; Altenburg  2000; Belderbos et al.  2001).
Quality and technical  requirements  associated  with goods targeted for the domestic market may
be lower  and thus  local suppliers may find it easier to serve multinationals  focused on the local
market.  On  the other hand,  multinationals  serving global  markets  may impose  more  stringent
cost  and quality requirements,  which may be  difficult  for  local  suppliers  to meet.  Moreover,
affiliates which are part of international production systems  are likely to be more dependent  on
global sourcing policies of their parent company and thus have less freedom to choose their own
suppliers.
Second, it has been argued that affiliates established through  M&As or joint ventures are
likely  to  source  more  locally  than  those  taking  form  of greenfield  projects  (UNCTC  2001).
While  the  latter  have  to  take  time  and  effort  to  develop  local  linkages,  the  former  can  take
advantages of the  supplier relationships  established  by the acquired  firm or their local partner.
Empirical  evidence to support this view has been found for Japanese investors (Belderbos  et al,
2001) and for Swedish affiliates  in Eastern  and Central Europe (UNCTC  2000).  In the case of
the  latter,  the  difference  persisted  also  in the  longer  term.12 While  in our  dataset we  cannot
distinguish between acquisitions, joint ventures  and greenfield projects, we have information on
the  extent  of foreign  ownership.  To  the  extent  that  full  foreign  ownership  is  a proxy  for
greenfield  projects,  we  expect that  fully-owned  foreign  affiliates  may rely more  on  imported
inputs, while investment projects with local capital participation will tend to source more locally.
Therefore,  backward  linkages  associated  with  the  latter  group  are  likely  to  result  in  greater
spillovers.
In what  follows,  we examine  the above  hypotheses.  Before  then,  however,  we review
briefly FDI-related developments in Lithuania.
suppliers provided they lived up to the expectations of  the new owner.  This, however, does not seem to have been
the case.  In 2002, eleven foreign suppliers of the French group will start operating in Romania,  thus replacing  the
Romanian producers from whom Dacia used to source.  Source:  Ziarul Financiar (Financial Newspaper) April  19,
2001.
12 The results of a study of the largest exporters in Hungary (Toth and Semjen 1999) also indicate that foreign
affiliates with larger share of foreign equity tend to purchase fewer inputs from Hungarian companies.
6Foreign Direct Investmemt  Rnim  Lkhuanla
Similarly to other former Soviet Republics, Lithuania had been virtually closed to foreign
investment before 1990.  After regaining its independence  in 1990, Lithuania began the process
of transition  to  a  market  economy  and  opened  its  borders  to  FDI.  Yet  unlike  transition
economies  of Central  and Eastern  Europe  (CEEC-10  hereafter),  it did not  receive  large FDI
inflows until the late  1990s.  The first stage of the privatization process, starting in 1991, offered
limited opportunities for foreign investors.  It was not until 1997 that FDI inflows into Lithuania
increased  significantly as a result of the second  stage of the privatization  process (see the chart
below).  As is evident from Table A below, the overall magnitude of FDI inflows has not been
very  large.  In  terms  of cumulative  FDI  inflows  per  capita  during  the  period  1993-2000,
Lithuania ranks  eighth among CEEC-10  above Bulgaria  and Romania.  In terms of the value of
cumulative FDI inflows, Lithuania ranks ninths exceeding only FDI receipts of Slovenia.
Net FDI  inflows into Lithuania
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7Table A.  FDI Inflows into CEEC-10 1993-2000.
Net FDI inflow (millions of US$)  2000  1993-2000
as % of  per  Value  Per capita
1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  GDP  capita  (mn US$)  (US$)
Czech Republic  654  878  2,568  1,435  1,286  3,700  6,313  4,583  9.3  446  21,417  2,085
Hungary  2,350  1,144  4,519  2,274  2,167  2,037  1,977  1,692  3.7  169  18,159  1,812
Estonia  162  214  201  150  266  581  305  387  7.8  270  2,268  1,580
oland  1,715  1,875  3,659  4,498  4,908  6,365  7,270  9,342  5.9  242  39,632  1,025
Latvia  45  214  180  382  521  357  348  407  5.7  169  2,454  1,015
Slovenia  113  128  177  194  375  248  181  181  1.0  91  1,597  803
Slovak Republic  199  270  236  351  174  562  354  2,052  10.7  380  4,198  777
Lithuania  30  31  73  152  355  926  486  379  3.4  102  2,432  658
Bulgaria  40  105  90  109  505  537  806  1,002  8.3  123  3,194  391
Romania  94  341  419  263  1,215  2,031  1,041  1,025  2.8  46  6,429  287
Source: IMF Intemational Financial  Statistics (FDI figures) and World Bank World Development Indicators (GDP  and population)
In  terms  of sectoral  distribution  of FDI,  44  percent  of FDI  stock  in  1996  was  in
manufacturing.  After  large  inflows  into  telecommunications  and  financial  sector,  this  figure
decreased to 32 percent in 2000.  When the number of projects is taken into account, in 1996 20
percent were in manufacturing,  as compared to 21 percent in 2000.  Within manufacturing,  food
products, beverages and tobacco  attracted the largest share of investment (12 percent of total FDI
stock),  followed by textiles and leather products  (4 percent), refined petroleum and chemicals (4
percent).  Electrical  machinery and optical  instruments  as  well as  wood products  also received
significant foreign investmnents.  As for service sectors, wholesale and retail trade accounted  for a
quarter of FDI stock in 2000, telecommunications  for 18 percent and financial intermediation for
14 percent.
Data and Methodology
The data  used  in  this  study come  from  the  annual  enterprise  survey  conducted  by the
Lithuanian Statistical Office.  The survey coverage is extensive, as firms accounting for about  85
percent of output in each sector are included in the sample.  The Lithuanian  enterprise data have
been praised  for their  high quality  and  reliability.13 The  data  constitute  an unbalanced  panel
spanning  over  the period  1996-2000.  The  number  of firms  per year  varies  from  over twelve
thousand in 1996 to twenty one thousand in  1999.  Due to financial constraints in some years the
13 A recent survey examining the quality of data collected by statistical offices ranked Lithuania second among
twenty transition economies  (see Belldndas et al.,  1999).
8Statistical Office was forced to reduce the scope of the exercise.  In each year, however, the same
sampling technique was used.  In this study, we restrict our attention to manufacturing firms only
(NACE sectors 15-36), which lowers the sample size to 2,500 to 4,000 firms a year.  The number
of observations is further reduced by missing values. Moreover, we exclude two sectors tobacco
(NACE  16)  and  manufacturing  of refined  petroleum  products  (NACE  23),  since  the  small
number of firms prevents us from applying the Olley-Pakes  technique (discussed below) to these
industries.  Thus we are left with a sample of between  1,921  and 2,712 firms in a given year. The
sectoral distribution of firms in the last year of the sample is presented in Table 1.
In  addition  to  standard  financial  statements,  the  dataset  contains  information  on the
amount  of foreign capital, if any, that has been invested in each firm, which allows  us to make
comparisons  between  FDI recipients  and  locally  owned  firms.  FDI recipients  are  defined  as
firms with the foreign share equal to at least ten percent of total capital.  More than 12 percent of
the total of 11,644 observations pertain to such firms.  The dataset  also includes information on
the share of exports in firm sales.
To examine  the correlation between  firm productivity  and foreign presence  in the same
industry  or  downstream  sectors,  we  follow  the  approach  taken  by  the  earlier  literature  and
estimate several variations of  the following equation:
In Yi, = a  + ,Ij In Kj,+  32 In Lt,+  83 In M1t + fl4 FS,, + P/ Horizontal,,  + /6  Backwardjt + ,
+ar+aj+  spyrt
Yi, stands for firm i's real output at time t, which is calculated by adjusting the reported sales for
changes in inventories of finished goods and deflating the resulting value by the Producer Price
Index for the appropriate  two-digit NACE  sector.  Kit, capital, is defined  as the value  of fixed
assets at  the  beginning of the  year,  deflated  by the  average of the  deflators  for  four NACE
sectors:  machinery  and  equipment;  office,  accounting  and  computing  machinery;  electrical
machinery  and  apparatus;  motor  vehicles,  trailer  and  semi-trailers;  and  other  transport
equipment.  Lib  employment,  is measured by the number of workers.14 Mit  material  inputs, are
equal to the value of material  inputs  adjusted  for  changes  in material  inventories,  deflated by
material inputs deflator calculated  for each sector based on the two-digit input-output matrix and
14 Ideally we would like to have  information on hours worked but, unfortunately,  it is not available.  Neither can we
distinguish between skilled and unskilled workers.
9deflators for the relevant two-digit  NACE sectors.  FSi, measures the share of foreign capital  in
finn's total capital.
Horizontal 11 captures the extent of foreign presence in the sector and is defined as foreign
equity  participation  averaged  over  all  firms  in  the  sector,  weighted  by  each  firm's  share  in
sectoral output. 1' 5 In other words,
Horizontaljt=  [Zjfb  all iej FS,  * Yid/ Eifor all iej Yu 1
Thus the value of the variable increases with the output of foreign investment enterprises and the
share of foreign capital in these firms.
The variable Backward  is a proxy for the foreign presence in the industries that are being
supplied by the  sector to which the firm in question belongs  and thus is intended to capture  the
extent  of potential  contacts  between  domestic  suppliers  and  multinational  customers.  It  is
defined in the following way:
Backwardj 1 = Zk if  k4  ajk Horizontals;
where ajk  is the  proportion of sector j  output  supplied to sector k  taken from the  1996  input-
output  matrix  at the  two-digit  NACE  level.  The  proportion  is  calculated  excluding  products
supplied  for final consumption but including imports of intermediate  products.' 6 As the formula
indicates,  we do not include inputs  supplied  within the sector,  since  we want this  effect  to be
captured by the Horizontal  variable.1 7 Thus the greater the foreign presence in sectors supplied
by industry j and the larger the share  of intermediates  supplied to industries  with multinational
presence, the higher the value of the variable.
While  the  coefficients  taken  from  the  input-output  table  remain  fixed,  we  observe
changes  in  foreign  presence  and  firm  output  during  the  period  in  question.  Thus  variables
capturing horizontal  and vertical linkages are time-varying sector-specific  variables.  In addition
to  the  calculation  described  above,  we  recalculated  the Horizontal variable  making  ii  firm
'5This definition is analogous to that in Aitken et al. (1999) who use employment as weights.  Blalock (2001) and
Schoors et al. (2001) employ output weights but do not take into account the share of foreign equity, treating total
output of firms with at least ten percent foreign equity as foreign.
16 Since relationships between sectors may change  over time (although a radical change is unlikely),  ideally we
would like to use multiple input-output matrices. Unfortunately,  input-output matrices for later years are
unavailable.  Similarly, while we would prefer to use a matrix excluding imnports,  it is not available.  Thus, our
results should be interpreted keeping these two caveats in mind.
" This approach is followed by Schoors et al. (2001) but not by Blalock (2001).  Including the share of
intermediates  supplied within the sector in the Backward measure (as was done in the earlier version of this paper)
does not change the conclusions  with respect to the correlation between firm productivity  and foreign presence in
the sourcing sectors.
10specific  by  excluding  the  output  of the  firm  in  question  in  the  calculations.  Since  both
definitions  lead  to  the  same  qualitative  results,  we  present  only  the  results  with the  latter
measure.18 Finally, the basic specification of the model also includes year, region and industry
dummies.  Summary statistics of the variables  employed are presented in Table 2.
Several  econometric  concerns  need  addressing.  The  first  one  is  the  omission  of
unobserved  variables.  There  may  exist  firm,  time  and  region  specific  factors  unknown  to
econometrician but known to the firm that may affect the correlation between firm productivity
and  foreign  presence.  Examples  of these  variables  include  high  quality  management  in  a
particular  firm  or better infrastructure  present  in a given region.  We  address this problem by
following Haskel et al. (2002) and using time differencing  as well as a full set of fixed effects for
year, industry and region.  As Haskel et al. point out, in addition  to removing any fixed plant-
specific  unobservable  variation,  differencing  will  also  remove  fixed  regional  and  industrial
effects such  as infrastructure  and technological  opportunity.  Time, industry and regional  fixed
effects  on  the other  hand  will control  for unobservables  that  may be driving  changes  in,  for
instance, attractiveness of a particular region or industry.'9 Thus our specification becomes
A In Yit = a  +  jAB  In Ki,+A  52a In Li+ 53 A ln Mit + 84 a FSt + °s a Horizontaliy
+ 86 A Backwardjl + a, +ar+aj+  e,t
Second,  as  Djankov  and  Hoekman  (2000)  and  Evenett  and  Voicu  (2001)  have  shown,
foreign investors tend to acquire stakes in the largest and most successful companies  in transition
economies.  If this  issue  is not  taken into  account,  the  estimation  results  could be biased.  To
avoid  such  a  bias,  we  also  estimate  our  model  on  a  sample  of  domestic  firms  only. 0
Additionally,  we have used the two-step procedure devised by Maddala  (1983).  The procedure
amounted to estimating first a probit model on whether or not firm i ever received FDI on firm
size (measured by total capital) and profitability (measured by the ratio of gross profits to  sales)
in the first year of the sample,  subsequently not used in the second stage.  The estimates from the
first  stage  were  then  used  to  form  an  additional  regressor  in  the  second  stage  estimation  of
18 Note that recalculating the Horizontal  variable will not affect the Backward measure since it does not take into
account inputs suppliers to own sector.
9 As Haskel et al. mention, in this case a fixed effect for region r captures not just the fact that region r is an
attractive business location but that its attractiveness  is rising over time.
20 Domestic firms are defined as those with less than ten percent of foreign equity..productivity on foreign presence,  annual and regional  dummies.  The results  (not reported here)
led to the same qualitative results.
Third, it has been argued that the use of ordinary least squares may be inappropriate when
estimating productivity  since this method  treats labor  and other inputs  as exogenous  variables.
Griliches  and Mairesse  (1995)  have  argued that inputs  should be considered  endogenous  since
they are chosen by firm based on its productivity, which is observed by the producer but not by
the  econometrician.  Not  taking  into  account  the  endogeneity  of input  choices  may bias  the
estimated  coefficients.  Since the focus  of this paper  is on firm productivity,  the consistency  of
the  estimates  is crucial  for our  analysis.  Therefore,  we  employ the semiparametric  estimation
procedure suggested by Olley and Pakes (1996).21  The details of the procedure are  described in
the Appendix.
A production  function,  taking  into account  the Olley-Pakes  correction,  is  estimated  for
each  industry  separately.  From  this  estimation,  we  recover  the  measure  of  total  factor
productivity,  which  is the difference  between the actual  and predicted  output,  and use it in the
estimation of our basic model.  Note that the Olley-Pakes  procedure  rests on the assumption of
factors fully adjusting to shocks in each period and markets being perfectly competitive.  Since
there may be some doubt about the validity of these assumptions, particularly in the context of a
transition  economy, we present the results both with  and without the correction.  Further,  while
this  method  also  allows  for  controlling  for  firm  exit,  we  do  not  utilize  this  option  since,
unfortinately, in our dataset we are unable to distinguish between firm exit from the sample due
to liquidation or due to not being included in the group of enterprises surveyed in a given year.
The last but not the  least econometric  concern has been pointed out by Moulton  (1990)
who shows  that in  the  case  of regressions  performed  on micro  units yet including  aggregated
market (or in our case industry) variables the standard errors from ordinary least squares will be
underestimated.  As  he  demonstrates,  failing  to  take  this  into  account  will  lead  to  a  serious
downward bias in the estimated errors resulting in spurious finding of statistical significance  for
the  aggregate  variable  of interest.  To  address  this  issue,  we correct  the  standard  errors  for a
correlation  between  observations  for  the  same  industry  in a  given  year  (in  other  words,  we
cluster standard errors for all observations for the same industry and year).
21 This method has been recently applied by, for instance, Pavcnik (2002).
12To the best of our knowledge,  none of the earlier spillover studies has taken into account
all of the above concerns. As for the papers on vertical spillovers,  Schoors et al. (2001) employ a
two-step selection procedure but do not include  firm  or industry  fixed effects (since their dataset
pertains to only a two-year period),  while Blalock  (2001)  controls for firm fixed effects but not
the  selection  issue.  Neither  study  includes  differencing  of spillover  variables,  correction  for
endogeneity  of input  choices  or  correction  of errors  for  the  downward  bias  pointed  out  by
Moulton (1990).
Estimation Results
The  results  from  the  first  differences  model  described  in  the  previous  section  are
presented in Table 3.  The first two columns contain the coefficients  estimated  for the full sample
followed by those for the subsample of domestic firms.  All of them pertain to the model without
the  Olley-Pakes  correction.  As  expected,  we  find  positive  and  significant  coefficients  on
changes in all production inputs as well as on change in the share of foreign equity.  This implies
that an increase in foreign capital participation in a given firm is associated with a faster output
growth.  As in the earlier studies,  the coefficient  on the proxy for horizontal spillovers does not
appear  to be  statistically  significant.  More  importantly  for this study,  we  find  a positive  and
significant  coefficient  on  the  measure  of backward  linkages  both in  the  full  sample  and  the
subsample  of domestic  firms.  The magnitude  of the effect is economically  meaningful  as a ten
percent increase in the foreign presence in downstream  sectors is associated with a 0.38 percent
rise in output of each domestic firm in the supplying industry.22
When the Olley-Pakes  correction is  applied  (see the last four columns of Table  3), the
coefficients on the backward variable  are positive  but not significant at the conventional levels.
As before, we find a positive correlation between the change in the foreign equity share and firm
productivity growth but no indication of the presence of horizontal spillovers.
In  Table 4  we  repeat  the  exercise,  this  time  however  focusing  on second  differences.
Looking at a longer time period produces  a higher R2, which is equal to about 0.54, as opposed
22 For comparison,  in their study of horizontal spillovers in the UK, Haskel et al. (2001) found that a rise often
percentage points in foreign presence in the same industry would increase output in each domestic plant in that
indust*y by 0.5 percent.
13to  0.38  in the previous  table.  Again  we  find positive  and significant  correlation  between  the
extent of foreign presence  in downstream  sectors and firm productivity.  This is the case for the
full sample as well as domestic firms, but only in the case when the Olley-Pakes correction is not
applied.  We  also  find  positive  correlation  between  foreign  presence  in the  same  sector  and
productivity of domestic  firms. This is not true, however, for the full sample or when we correct
for the endogeneity of input choices.
The  next  issue  we  turn  to  is  whether  potential  spillovers  operate  at  the  regional  or
national  level.  To examine this question we calculate  the Backward measure  for the region of
the firm in question  as well as for  all other regions.  Since Lithuania is a relatively  small country,
for the purpose of this exercise we focus on ten regions. Analogously, we compute one measure
of,horizontal spillovers  for the region where the firm in question  is located  and another measure
pertaining to all other regions.  Note that the measures pertaining to own region are firm specific
since they exclude  the output  of the  firm in  question.  Since  in this model,  we do not  face the
problem of industry-specific variables and firm-specific  observations, we do not cluster standard
errors for industry and instead apply a general correction  for heteroskedasticity.
The results presented in Table  5 show a positive and significant correlation between firm
productivity and foreign presence in downstream  sectors in the same region.  The coefficients are
significant  in  all  eight  regressions,  even  when  the  Olley-Pakes  correction  is  applied.  The
coefficients  are  larger  in  magnitude  and  more  significant  in  the  case  of the  domestic  firm
subsample.  As  for  the  impact  of downstream  multinationals  in  other  regions,  this  effects  is
positive  and  significant  only  in the  first  four columns  of the  table.  The proxies  for  foreign
presence  in the same sector (both in the same region and other parts of the country)  do not appear
to be statistically significant.
As  mentioned before,  case  studies  and evidence based on particular sectors  suggest that
domestic-market-oriented  affiliates  tend  to  source  more  locally  than  the  affiliates  focused  on
exporting.  And  since  the  extent  of spillovers  is  likely  to  be  correlated  with  the  intensity  of
contacts  between  domestic  firms  and  multinationals,  we  would  expect  to  observe  greater
spillovers  associated  with  domestic-market-oriented  affiliates.  To  examine  this  question,  we
calculate two separate measures of backward  linkages:  one for affiliates exporting more than half
14of their output  and one for foreign  firms  selling at least half of their output  locally.  The  latter
variable is defined as follows:
Backward (Domestic-Market-Oriented) 11 = Ek ifk4  ajk * [XiFSik  *DMOikt* Output,k2J,/  Outputikt
where DMOikt = 1 if firm i sold at least half of its output in the local market.  Otherwise, it takes
on the value of zero.  The measure  for export-oriented  affiliates  in calculated analogously.  We
include both measures in our model keeping the horizontal variable defined as before.
The results presented  in Table 6 provide  some support  for the hypothesis.  While we find
that  in all  eight  regressions,  both backward  measures  are positive  and statistically  significant,
their coefficients  are larger in the case of domestic-market-oriented  affiliates.  The difference  in
magnitude  between  the  two  types  of backward  measures  is  statistically  significant  at  the  one
percent  level  in four  cases,  five  percent  in two  cases  and  ten  percent  in the  remaining  two
regressions.
Next we turn to the  hypothesis  that backward  linkages  associated with partially-owned
foreign projects lead  to greater  spillovers  than linkages  to wholly-owned  foreign  affiliates.  To
examine this question  we calculate two measures  of backward  linkages:  one for firms with the
share  of foreign  capital  equal  to  at  least  99  percent  and  one  for  remaining  enterprises  with
foreign participation.23
The results  shown in Table  7, however,  lend little support to the hypothesis.  While  we
find  evidence  of significant  positive spillovers  associated  with jointly-owned  foreign  affiliates
but  no  evidence  of spillovers  in  the  case  of wholly-owned  foreign  projects,  the  difference
between the magnitudes  of the coefficients  is not statistically  significant.  Moreover,  when the
Olley-Pakes  correction  is  applied,  the  backward  variables  do  not  appear  to  be  statistically
significant.
23 There are 262 observations pertaining to fully owned foreign affiliates  and further 25 observations  for firms with
foreign capital share of more than 99 and less than  100 percent.
15Conclusions
Many  countries,  including  developing  and  transition  economies,  compete  against  one
another  in  attracting  foreign investors by offering  ever  more generous  incentive  packages  and
justifying  their  actions  with  the  productivity  gains  that  are  expected  to  accrue  to  domestic
producers  from  knowledge  externalities  generated  by foreign  affiliates.  Despite  this  question
being hugely important to public policy choices, there is little conclusive evidence to support this
claim.
This study is an  effort to  further  our understanding  of this  issue.  It examines  whether
there  exists  a correlation  between  productivity  growth of domestic  firms  and  the  presence  of
foreign affiliates  in downstream  sectors.  It improves  over the  existing literature by focusing on
the understudied  issue of FDI spillover through backward linkages  (i.e., contacts between foreign
affiliates  and their local  suppliers)  rather than  the horizontal  channel  (i.e.,  benefits  enjoyed  by
domestic  firms from foreign presence in their sector)  and going beyond the existing  studies by
shedding  some  light  on  factors  driving  this  phenomenon.  This  study  also  addresses  several
econometric problems that may have biased the results of the earlier research.
The estimation results, based on a firm-level panel data set from Lithuania,  are consistent
with  the  presence  of productivity  spillovers  taking  place  through backward  linkages.  They
suggest that a rise of ten percent in the  foreign presence  in downstream  industries  is associated
with a 0.38 percent increase  in output of each domestic firm in the upstream sector.  Moreover,
the data indicate that such spillovers are not restricted  geographically,  since local firms seem to
benefit from the operation of foreign affiliates  in their own region as well as in other parts of the
country.  Further, we find that greater productivity benefits  are associated with domestic-market-
rather than export-oriented  foreign companies.  We detect no difference,  however,  between  the
effects of fully-owned foreign firms and those with joint domestic and foreign ownership.
As  is  often the  case with  empirical  studies,  our  results  are  subjects  to  several  caveats.
Our definitions  of industries  are  quite  broad and  thus inevitably we  may be lumping together
producers  of products that are significantly different. Moreover,  given the data limitation, we are
unable to control for firm entry and exit.  Finally, we want to stress that our findings of a positive
correlation  between  productivity  growth  enjoyed  by  domestic  firms  and  the  increase  in
multinational presence in downstream  sectors  should not be interpreted  as a call for subsidizing
16FDI.  These  results  are  consistent  with  the  existence  of knowledge  spillovers  from  foreign
affiliates  to their local suppliers but they may also be due to increased competition  in upstream
sectors.  While the former case would call for offering FDI incentive packages,  it would not be
the optimal  policy  in  the  latter.  Further  research  is  certainly  needed to disentangle  different
channels through which FDI spillovers operate.
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20Table 1. Distribution of Firms with Foreign Capital by Industry (number of firms in 2000)
Share of Firms
DomesticaRy  Firms with  with  Foreign
NACE  omed  icary  Foreign  All Firms  Capital In the
Owned  Firms  Capital*  sector
(%)
15  Manuf. of food products  and beverages  437  55  492  11
17  Manuf. of textiles  84  34  118  29
18  Manuf. of wearing apparel; dressing, dyeing of fur  201  49  250  20
20  Manuf. of wood & wood products except fumiture  432  47  479  10
22  Publishing, printing & reproduction of recorded media  225  12  237  5
24  Manuf. of chemicals & chemical products  48  17  65  26
25  Manuf. of rubber & plastic  products  1.18  25  143  17
26  Manuf. of other non-metallic mineral products  148  18  166  11
28  Manuf  of fabricated  metal products, exc. machinery  169  25  194  13
29  Manuf. of machinery & equipment n.e.c  106  13  119  11
31  Manuf. of electrical mach. & apparatus n.e.c.  43  5  48  10
32  Manuf. of radio, tv, communication equipment  28  5  33  15
Manuf. of medical, precision & optical  instruments,
33  46  9  55  16
watches
35  Manuf of other transport equipment  40  8  48  17
36  Manuf. of furniture;  manufacturing n.e.c.  169  20  189  11
Total  2,294  342  2,636  13
* foreign share of at least 10 percent of total capital
21Table 2.  Summary Statistics
Variable  No. of obs.  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max
Output  11,652  5,587,446  24,300,000  11  660,000,000
No. of employees  11,652  84  238  1  6,176
Fixed Assets  11,652  2,587,088  11,000,000  10  298,000,000
Material Inputs  11,652  2,898,996  13,300,000  2  376,000,000
Gross Investment  11,652  429,823  2,681,202  0  82,300,000
Foreign capital  share (%)  11,644  7.8  23.0  0  100.0
Exports/Output (%)  9,776  21.0  34.0  0  100.0
Horizontal  (%)  11,644  19.7  12.3  0  79.5
Horizontal same region (%)  11,633  15.8  15.6  0  100.0
Horizontal other region (%)  11,652  19.3  13.9  0  81.0
Backward  (%)  11,652  4.9  4.0  0  17.2
Backward same region (%)  11,652  2.8  2.9  0  30.0
Backward other region (%)  11,652  4.3  3.8  0  18.5
Backward (Export-oriented  MNCs)  11,652  3.1  2.6  0  16.6
Backward (Local-market-oriented  MNCs)  11,652  1.8  2.0  0  13.4
Backward (Full ownership)  11,652  1.9  2.0  0  14.7
Backward  (Shared ownership)  11,652  3.0  2.5  0  8.9
22Table 3. Regresions in First Differences
with Olley-Pakes  correction
All firms  Domestic firms  All firms  Domestic firms
A In L  0.373***  0.373***  0.360***  0.359***
(0.019)  (0.019)  (0.021)  (0.021)
A In K  0.040***  0.040***  0.038***  0.039***
(0.013)  (0.013)  (0.012)  (0.012)
A in M  0.212***  0.212***  0.212***  0.212***
(0.020)  (0.020)  (0.019)  (0.019)
A Foreign share  0.001**  0.001**  0.001**  0.001**
(0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)
A Backward  0.038*  0.038*  0.038*  0.038*  0.030  0.030  0.030  0.030
(0.019)  (0.019)  (0.021)  (0.021)  (0.025)  (0.025)  (0.027)  (0.027)
A Horizontal  -0.001  0.000  0.000  0.000
(0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.003)
Intercept  -0.056  -0.054  -0.068  -0.070  -0.057  -0.055  -0.075  -0.078
(0.056)  (0.057)  (0.049)  (0.050)  (0.058)  (0.057)  (0.057)  (0.057)
Year dummies  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes
Industry dummies  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes
Regional dummies  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes
No. of obs.  6862  6862  5925  5923  6862  6862  5925  5923
F-stat  51.96  50.56  42.4  42.38  2.86  2.77  2.15  2.13
Prob > F  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
R2  0.38  0.38  0.37  0.37  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01
Standard errors have been corrected  for clustering for each industry in each year. *  *,  * denote  significance  at  1, 5 and  10%  level.
23Table 4. Regresions  in Second  Differences
with Olley-Pakes  correction
All firms  Domestic  firms  All firms  Domestic firms
A In L  0.486***  0.486***  0.487***  0.486***
(0.028)  (0.028)  (0.032)  (0.032)
A In  K  0.050***  0.051***  0.051***  0.051***
(0.012)  (0.012)  (0.013)  (0.013)
A In  M  0.291***  0.291***  0.287***  0.287***
(0.029)  (0.029)  (0.026)  (0.026)
A  Foreign share  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001
(0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)
A Backward  0.032*  0.028*  0.037**  0.030*  0.022  0.018  0.023  0.017
(0.017)  (0.015)  (0.018)  (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.017)
A Horizontal  0.003  0.004*  0.003  0.004
(0.003)  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.003)
Intercept  -0.096**  -0.117**  -0.114**  -0.141**  -0.107**  -0.125**  -0.113*  -0.135**
(0.046)  (0.054)  (0.056)  (0.063)  (0.046)  (0.051)  (0.057)  (0.063)
Year dummies  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes
industry dummies  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes
Regional  dummies  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes
No. of obs.  4557  4557  3929  3929  4557  4557  3929  3929
F-stat  213.16  207.94  128.86  139.34  23.06  34.58  45  35.04
Prob > F  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
R2  0.54  0.54  0.53  0.53  0.03  0.03  0.03  0.03
Standard errors have been corrected for clustering for each industry in each year.  *  **, * denote significance  at the 1, 5 and 10%  level.
24Table 5. Regresions  in First Differences.  Intra- versus Inter-regional Spillovers
with Ofley-Pakes  correction
All firms  Domestic firms  All firms  Domestic finns
A In L  0.372***  0.372***  0.359***  0.359***
(0.018)  (0.018)  (0.019)  (0.019)
A  In K  0.040***  0.040***  0.038***  0.039***
(0.010)  (0.010)  (0.011)  (0.011)
A  In M  0.213***  0.212***  0.212***  0.212***
(0.011)  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.011)
A Foreign share  0.001**  0.001**  0.001*  0.001*
(0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)
A Backward same region  0.016**  0.016**  0.019***  0.019***  0.015*  0.015*  0.018**  0.017**
(0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008)
A Backward other region  0.021**  0.021**  0.024**  0.023**  0.017  0.017  0.018  0.018
(0.010)  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.012)  (0.013)
A  Horizontal  same region  0.000  -0.001  0.000  0.000
(0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)
A Horizontal other region  0.001  0.000  0.000  0.000
(0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.002)
Intercept  -0:060**  -0.062**  -0.072**  -0.074**  -0.059*  -0.060*  -0.078**  -0.080**
(0.030)  (0.031)  (0.033)  (0.033)  (0.033)  (0.034)  (0.037)  (0.038)
Year dummies  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes
Industry dummies  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes
Regional dummies  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes
No. of obs.  6862  6853  5925  5923  6862  6853  5925  5923
F-stat  42.06  39.96  38.36  36.35  2.61  2.44  2.17  2.10
Prob > F  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
R2  0.38  0.38  0.37  0.37  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01
Robust standard errors.  *  **,  * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level.
25Table 6. Regresions in First Differences.  Spillovers  Associated with Export- versus Domestic-market-oriented  Foreign Affiliates
with Olley-Pakes  correction
All firms  Domestic firms  All firms  Domestic firms
A In L  0.373***  0.373***  0.360***  0.360***
(0.019)  (0.019)  (0.021)  (0.021)
A in K  0.040***  0.040***  0.038***  0.039***
(0.013)  (0.013)  (0.012)  (0.012)
AInM  0.213***  0.213***  0.213***  0.212***
(0.020)  (0.020)  (0.019)  (0.019)
A  Foreign share  0.001*  0.001*  0.001**  0.001*
(0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)
A Backward (export-oriented)  0.033**  0.033**  0.032**  0.032**  0.028*  0.028*  0.028*  0.028*
(0.013)  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.016)
A Backward (local-market-oriented)  0.049***  0.050***  0.058***  0.058***  0.050**  0.050**  0.059***  0.059**
(0.017)  (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.022)  (0.022)  (0.023)  (0.023)
A Horizontal  -0.001  0.000  -0.001  0.000
(0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.003)
Intercept  -0.057  -0.052  -0.071  -0.071  -0.058  -0.055  -0.078  -0.080
(0.057)  (0.059)  (0.051)  (0.052)  (0.059)  (0.059)  (0.059)  (0.058)
Year dummies  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes
Industry dummies  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes
Regional dummies  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes
No. of obs.  6862  6862  5925  5923  6862  6862  5925  5923
F-stat  56.11  54.57  43.73  43.28  3.1  3.01  2.86  2.93
Prob > F  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
0.38  0.38  0.38  0.38  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.02
BK (export) diff from BK (local-mkt-or)  yes(5%)  yes(10%)  yes(1%)  yes(1%)  yes(5%)  yes(6%)  yes(1%)  yes(1%)
Standard errors have been corrected for clustering for each industry in each year. *  **, * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level.
26Table 7. Regresions in First Differences.  Spillovers  Associated  with Fully- versus Partially-Owned  Foreign Affiliates
with Olley-Pakes  correction
All firms  Domestic firms  All firms  Domestic  firms
A In L  0.373***  0.373***  0.360***  0.359***
(0.019)  (0.019)  (0.021)  (0.021)
A In K  0.040***  0.040***  0.038***  0.039***
(0.013)  (0.013)  (0.012)  (0.012)
A In M  0.212***  0.213***  0.212***  0.212***
(0.020)  (0.020)  (0.019)  (0.019)
A Foreign share  0.001**  0.001**  0.001**  0.001**
(0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)
ABackward(fully-owned)  0.029  0.028  0.041  0.041  0.011  0.011  0.012  0.012
(0.025)  (0.025)  (0.028)  (0.029)  (0.031)  (0.031)  (0.035)  (0.035)
A Backward (partially-owned)  0.040*  0.040*  0.037*  0.037*  0.034  0.034  0.033  0.033
(0.020)  (0.020)  (0.023)  (0.023)  (0.025)  (0.025)  (0.028)  (0.028)
A Horizontal  -0.001  0.000  -0.001  0.000
(0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.003)
Intercept  -0.054  -0.051  -0.069  -0.071  -0.051  -0.048  -0.070  -0.072
(0.057)  (0.058)  (0.049)  (0.050)  (0.060)  (0.060)  (0.059)  (0.059)
Year dummies  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes
Industry dummies  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes
Regional dummies  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes
No. of obs.  6862  6862  5925  5923  6862  6862  5925  5923
F-stat  53.93  52.17  40.77  40.96  3.5  3.41  2.2  2.19
Prob > F  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
R-squared  0.38  0.38  0.37  0.37  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01
BK (fully) diff from BK (part)  no  no  no  no  no  no  no  no
Standard errors have been corrected for clustering for each industry in each year.  ***, **,  * denote  significance  at the  1, 5 and  10% level.
27Appendix
Estimation Procedure with Olley-Pakes  Correction
We  employ  the  semi-parametric  estimation  of  the  production  function  parameters
suggested by Olley and Pakes (1996)  to account  for the endogeneity of input selection by
the firm.
We assume that at the beginning  of every period  a firm chooses variable  factors  (labor)
and a  level  of investment,  which together  with  the  current  capital  value determine  the
capital stock  at  the beginning  of the next period.  The capital  accumulation  equation  is
given by
k1+,=  (1- 6)kt + it  (1)
where k=capital  and  i=investment.
We start with the following Cobb-Douglas production function model:
yit - mi,t  = a + /3A*1,t + A*ki, +  +  17it  (2)
where y-m=log  (output-materials)=log  of value added,  I=log of labor,  and  subscripts  i
and t stand for firm and time, respectively.  acdenotes productivity,  and  77  stands for either
measurement  error (which can be serially correlated) or a shock to productivity which is
not  forecastable  during  the  period  in  which  labor  can  be  adjusted.  Both  o and  iq  are
unobserved.  The difference  is that  a  is a  state variable  in the firm's  decision  problem
and thus affects  the input demand while  77  does not.  Labor is assumed  to be a freely
variable  input.  Capital  is  a  fixed  factor  and  is  only  affected  by  the  distribution  of
w conditional on information at time t-I and past values of co.
Since  the  unobserved  productivity  shock  co  is  assumed  to  be  correlated  with  kit,  the
estimated  coefficient  AI  will be biased.  The  insight of the method is that the  observable
characteristics of the firm can be modeled as a monotonic function of the productivity of
the firm.  Inverting  such a function allows us to model the unobserved  component  of the
productivity as a function of the observed variables, namely investment.
The investment decision depends on capital stock and firm productivity:
i,= it (a7,  kd  (3)
By inverting  the above  equation, we can express unobserved productivity  co as a function
of observable investment and capital and thus we are able to control for c in estimation.
o=  hi (it, kd  (4)
28By substituting (4) into (2), we obtain the equation to be estimated in the first stage of the
procedure:
yi, - mit = a + 61*/ft+  ,8k*kit +  h(ii,,k,d + vi,  (5)
The functional form of ho  is not known. Therefore,  the A3i  and fk coefficients  cannot be
estimated  at  this  stage.  We  estimate  the  partially  linear  model  using  a  third  order
polynomial  expansion  in capital  and  investment  to  approximate  the form of the  h(. 24
From this stage we have the consistent estimate of the labor input coefficient  (fid as well
as the estimate of the third order polynomial in ii, and kit , which we refer to as 'it.
Yfi=  =  + /k*kit  +  h(iit,kid  (6)
Thus,
h  (iij, kid = vlit - A *kit  (7)
The  second  step  of the  estimation procedure  considers  the  expectation  of y,+,  - mt+l -
A*1,+,
E[yj+ - mt+l - ,8*It+l  I  k,]  (8)
= a +flk*kt+, + E[+j  I  , oh]
k*kt+, + g(&t)
Assuming that  l, is  serially correlated,  we can rewrite  w,+,  as a function  of a,  letting
5,+, be the innovation in  A-,+ 1 Using (4) and (7), the above equation becomes  a function
of iit  and ki,
Yt+J - mt+l  - ,I  *lt+i  = Ak  *k+,  + g( t, - Ak*kt)  + 4t+1 +  Q +j  (9)
where g is the third order polynomial of  V/, -
13k *kt. This is the equation to be estimated in
the second  stage  of the  procedure.  Only  in this stage  we  are  able to obtain  consistent
estimates of  lk. Since the capital in use in a given period is assumed to be known at the
beginning  of the  period  and  4z+j  is. mean  independent  of all  variables  known  at  the
beginning  of the  period,  st+j  is  mean independent  of k,+,.  We  use the non-linear  least
squares to estimate. the above equation.
24  Olley and Pakes (1996) suggest both a kemel and a series estimator, but favor the former since its
limiting distribution is known.
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